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Resumen: ¿Por qué un partido político que ha sido competitivo por décadas colapsa de 
un día para otro? En los últimos años, los partidos políticos en América Latina han 
pasado de ser los actores principales para puestos ejecutivos a ser electoralmente 
irrelevantes en el transcurso de un único ciclo electoral. Para explicar este fenómeno se 
enfatiza el impacto de las acciones de la élite en el comportamiento de los votantes. 
Durante las décadas de 1980 y 1990, los líderes de toda la región aplicaron políticas que 
eran incompatibles con su tradicional marca de partido, provocando conflictos internos 
y formando extrañas alianzas con quienes eran sus rivales tradicionales. Estos 
comportamientos diluyeron las marcas partidistas, erosionando los lazos partidarios. Sin 
el apoyo seguro de sus partidarios los partidos se vuelven más susceptibles al voto 
retrospectivo, y los votantes que ya no tienen lazos partidarios abandonan a los partidos 
de gobierno cuando no obtienen buenos resultados. Esta hipótesis interactiva se pone a 
prueba utilizando comparaciones por pares de seis casos de elecciones de Argentina y 
Venezuela 
Palabras clave: partidos políticos, identificación partidaria, colapso de partidos, dilución 




Abstract: Why would a national political party that has been competitive for decades 
collapse overnight?  In recent years, parties across Latin America went from being major 
contenders for executive office to electoral irrelevance over the course of a single 
electoral cycle. I develop an explanation that highlights the impact of elite actions on 
voter behavior. During the 1980s and 1990s, leaders across the region implemented 
policies that were inconsistent with their traditional party brand, provoked internal party 
conflicts, and formed strange-bedfellow alliances with traditional rivals. These actions 
diluted the brands of their parties, eroding voters’ partisan attachments. Without the 
assured support of partisans, parties become more susceptible to retrospective voting.  
Voters who now had no party attachments deserted incumbent parties when they 
performed poorly.  I test this interactive hypothesis using matched comparisons of six 
party-election cases from Argentina and Venezuela. 























Between 1958 and 1993, Venezuela’s two major parties, Democratic Action (AD) and the 
Independent Political Electoral Organizing Committee (COPEI), together drew an average 
of 78 percent of the vote in national elections. But by 1998, a mere 3% of Venezuelans 
cast their ballots for these parties. After Bolivia transitioned to democracy in 1980, the 
three parties that dominated politics –the rightist Nationalist and Democratic Action 
(ADN), centrist Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), and center-left 
Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) –together received an average of 67 percent of the 
vote. But in 2002, ADN attracted only 3 percent of the vote, and neither it nor the MIR 
even fielded a presidential candidate in the 2005 election. 
The dramatic and sudden decline in the staying power of established political parties is 
one of the most puzzling features of Latin American democratic politics since the Third 
Wave of democratization. Between 1978 and 2007, one-quarter of the region’s 
established parties broke down, meaning that they suddenly became uncompetitive for 
national executive office. Parties that had only recently been major competitors were 
relegated to an average vote share of merely 6 percent.  Yet these very parties, some 
more than a century old, had survived economic booms and busts, authoritarian 
repression, guerrilla insurgencies, and revolutionary movements. 
Why, then, have many broken down in recent decades? Traditional theories of party 
politics fall flat in explaining party breakdown. Scholars of political parties expect party 
systems to form around enduring social cleavages or the political struggles that surround 
their emergence. Proponents of spatial models of party competition expect parties to 
consistently match voter preferences. Neither tradition can explain why established 
parties break down suddenly and decisively. 
Scholars of comparative politics often attribute party breakdowns instead to poor 
performance by incumbent parties. Corruption scandals or poor economic stewardship, 
they argue, cause voters to reject the incumbent party en masse, leading the party to 
break down (e.g., Coppedge 2005; Dietz and Myers 2007; Kenney 2004; Seawright 2012). 
But bad performance is far more widespread than party breakdown, and established 





















President Alan García’s economic policies led to some of the worst hyperinflation in 
world history, peaking in 1989 at 12,378%. Still, at the end of García’s term, his Popular 
American Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party received nearly a quarter of the vote and 
fell just 10 percentage points shy of the winner. Bad performance is undoubtedly 
important, but it is not the whole story. 
Others scholars suggest that institutional or structural changes such as electoral reforms, 
decentralization, and economic upheaval fatally weakened Latin America’s established 
parties.1 No doubt many of these factors posed serious challenges for parties in the 
region. But they should have affected all the parties more or less equally. Why, instead, 
do we often see one established party collapse even as other established parties in that 
country survive? Studies that focus on macro-level explanations have been unable to 
explain the differences in party fortunes both across and within countries. The problem 
is that, like much scholarship on parties in the region, they view Latin American politics 
in terms of groups and coalitions. 
Party breakdown, however, is fundamentally about the attitudes and choices of voters. It 
is individual voters who decide to reject an established party they themselves had just 
recently supported. In fact, party breakdowns are preceded by declines in partisan 
attachments.2 In the early 1980s, many Latin American voters identified with these 
established parties, and many had inherited these attachments from their parents.  During 
much of the 1990s, however, voters in many Latin American countries appeared to 
detach from these parties. In 1986, 58% of Argentines professed identifying with that 
country’s two established parties, the Peronist party (PJ) and the Radical Civic Union 
(UCR) (Catterberg 1989: 63). By 2003, that number had dwindled to 16 percent.3 In 
Venezuela, a 1981 survey found that over half of respondents identified with AD or 
                                                        
1 Prior studies of party breakdown in Latin America focus on system-wide collapses in which all established 
parties break down simultaneously (e.g., Morgan 2011; Seawright 2012; Tanaka 2006). Such cases are 
particularly dramatic and consequential, but exceedingly rare, making it difficult to draw general 
conclusions. This paper represents the first comparative analysis of breakdown at the level of individual 
parties. 
2 Throughout this paper, I use the terms partisanship, partisan attachments, and party identification 
interchangeably to refer to an individual’s self-identification with a political party. 
3 These figures are based on an August 2003 survey of 404 adult residents of Greater Buenos Aires 





















COPEI, but only 12% still did so in 1998.4 Importantly, this erosion of voters’ attachments 
to established political parties began before the economic declines to which their 
eventual fates are attributed. Something more than anti-incumbency was at work.  We 
need to know why voters’ attachments to the parties erode and why, and when, that 
erosion leads them to abandon their party at the polls. 
This paper offers the first general explanation of party breakdown in Latin America. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, politicians across Latin America implemented policies that 
were inconsistent with the traditional positions of their party, provoked internal party 
conflicts, and formed strange-bedfellow alliances with traditional rivals. These actions 
blurred voters’ perceptions of parties’ brands –the kinds of voters the parties represent– 
eroding voters’ attachments to them. Without the assured support of a partisan base, 
parties become more susceptible to voters’ short-term retrospective evaluations. Voters 
who now had no party attachments deserted incumbent parties when they performed 
poorly. What looked like erratic voters suddenly abandoning the established parties they 
used to support was actually the result of a process of brand dilution. 
I test this theory using matched comparisons of six party-election cases from Argentina 
and Venezuela. Within each case, I trace the processes of brand maintenance or brand 
dilution and seek to identify their effects on aggregate partisan attachment. I then draw 
analytical leverage from comparing cases within the same party over time, across parties 
within the same system, and across systems. These comparisons reveal that brand 
dilution is associated with partisan erosion, but that it alone is not sufficient to cause 
party breakdown. Bad performance is also not a sufficient condition for party 
breakdown; it is the combination of brand dilution and bad performance that is sufficient 
to cause established parties to break down. My analysis shows that when party brands 
blur and when the differences between party alternatives become meaningless, even 
those party identities that once seemed unbending will wither. When diluted party brands 
are combined with poor performance by established parties, these parties break down. 
 
                                                        






















II. The Puzzle of Party Breakdown 
Parties regularly come and go in the new democracies outside Latin America (see, e.g., 
Kreuzer and Pettai 2003). As voters learn about the parties and elites increasingly form 
strategic coalitions, some parties become electorally irrelevant and disappear (Tavits 
2005; Tavits and Annus 2006). But this “shaking out” of the party system (Bernhard and 
Karakoç 2011: 3) cannot account for the breakdown of Latin America’s more established 
parties. 
Neither do classical theories of party politics offer much traction in explaining these 
cases. Cleavage-based theories expect parties and party systems to change when the 
politically salient social cleavage shifts (e.g., Dalton et al. 1984; Sundquist 1983). Theories 
such as these are helpful in explaining long-term trends of party decline and evolution, 
but they are difficult to apply to rapid shifts in a party’s electoral fortunes. The slow 
shifting of social cleavages is unlikely to explain the sudden breakdown of a party. 
Other aspects of the electoral environment, however, may change more quickly.  
Established parties –organizations that have remained competitive over decade– have 
adapted to existing environments (Cox 1997). So, major changes could threaten their 
survival. Making institutional arrangements, such as the rules governing elections, more 
permissive could have dramatic effects on parties that had adapted specifically to the old 
arrangement (Benton 2001; Centellas 2009; Kenney 2004; Remmer 2008; Tuesta 
Soldevilla 1996). They could also ease the entry of competitor parties that threaten 
established ones (Van Cott 2005). Or decentralizing political or fiscal authority –reforms 
that swept the developing world in the 1990s– could undermine national parties by 
strengthening local politicians (Morgan 2011; Penfold-Becerra 2009). 
Parties might also confront new social environments, especially in the economically 
volatile developing world. The debt crisis that swept Latin America in the 1980s, for 
instance, dramatically altered the socioeconomic environment for politicians. Default and 
economic stagnation meant high unemployment and shrinking government budgets. For 
parties that relied on state resources to fund patronage machines, these changes could 






















Those parties that can adapt effectively will survive these institutional or social changes, 
whereas those too rigid to evolve may disappear. If party organizations are too 
institutionalized, if they privilege entrenched groups, or if their activist base is too 
extreme, they may fail to accommodate changing voter preferences (Coppedge 2005; 
Seawright 2012). In the Latin American context, those that relied most heavily on 
patronage might have found it particularly hard to mobilize support without access to 
state resources (Burgess 1999; Levitsky and Way 1998; Morgan 2011). Alternatively, 
those that relied on clientelism might have been able to cushion themselves against the 
forces of electoral decline (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Levitsky 2003). 
The crises and reforms of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America undoubtedly challenged 
established parties. But politics is always dynamic; these same parties had adapted to 
dramatic social and institutional changes in the past. They had survived economic 
depressions, military dictatorships, even major revolutions. Indeed, established parties 
across the region –even some of those considered most institutionalized– did adapt to 
new and changing contexts. Some reneged on campaign promises and completely 
reversed their historic policy positions (Campello Forthcoming; Stokes 2001), often 
forcing entrenched labor groups to go along with painful economic reforms (Murillo 
2001). Others implemented more flexible internal procedures, severed links to certain 
interest groups, or adopted open primary elections, all in an effort to address changing 
public expectations. 
Clientelism helped many Latin American parties maintain local bases of support over 
decades. But parties that relied on patronage to drum up voter support also based their 
decades of electoral appeals on far more. Established parties, in fact, generated deep-
seated loyalties that went far beyond quid pro quo exchange. In much of the region, 
supporters went to war for these parties or faced imprisonment and torture when they 
were banned by military regimes. In fact, clientelist parties often target voters who 
already identify with the party (Stokes et al. 2012). And patterns of partisanship across 
Latin America suggest clientelism is not the basis for most voters’ attachments to parties 
(Lupu 2013a).5 Moreover, clientelism alone, or lack of it, is unlikely to account for the 
massive changes in the national electoral fortunes of established parties. The difference 
                                                        
5 The evidence I present also runs against the notion that clientelism maintains partisan attachments.  
Voter attachments with the PJ in Argentina declined in the 1990s even though the party ramped up its 





















between parties that survived and those that broke down was millions of votes, and even 
the region’s most efficient political machines are unlikely to sway so many voters, 
particularly as clientelism also entails electoral costs (Weitz-Shapiro Forthcoming). 
The institutional reforms and social transformations of the period were also not uniform 
enough across the region to explain the varied fortunes of established parties in different 
countries (see Eaton and Dickovic 2004; Remmer 2008; Tulchin and Selee 2004). Parties 
broke down in countries that did not decentralize at all, whereas others survived despite 
changes to the electoral rules. 
Within countries, many of these changes should have affected all parties more or less 
equally. After all, it is countries that reform their electoral rules, and whole party systems 
that should be affected by decentralization. And yet it is individual parties that broke 
down. Arguments that focus on system-wide transformations have a hard time explaining 
why one established party collapses even when others in the same country live to fight 
another day. One could argue that system-level changes affected some parties more than 
others,6 but these kinds of explanations would need to specify what made some parties 
more susceptible than others. An adequate explanation of party breakdown needs to 
grapple with the different outcomes both across and within countries. 
Instead, the macro perspective is all too common in scholarship on Latin American party 
politics. Scholars typically study parties in the region in corporatist terms, with interest 
groups, party strategies, and elite coalitions taking center stage. Individual citizens at best 
play a secondary role in these accounts. And they rarely consider how voters form 
attitudes or make voting decisions. 
The received scholarship on party breakdown in Latin America misses a crucial part of 
the story: the decline in voters’ attachments to these parties in the years prior to their 
collapse.7 The fact that voters’ attachments to established parties declined precipitously 
undoubtedly plays a role in their eventual breakdown. Instead, this paper offers a voter-
                                                        
6 For instance, one could argue that parties that historically relied more heavily on patronage were more 
likely to break down as a result of declining state resources. But many patronage-based parties in the region 
survived the neoliberal era, whereas those far less reliant on state resources broke down. 
7 Morgan (2011) and Seawright (2012) are exceptions; although both offer explanations for partisan 





















centered explanation of party breakdown, building upon a model of partisanship that also 
explains trends in partisan attachments. 
III. Brand Dilution and Party Breakdown 
Why did some parties in Latin America break down whereas others, even within the 
same country, did not? And why have partisan attachments for some Latin American 
parties eroded precipitously in recent decades? Party attachments are group identities, 
akin to the attachments people form to social groups. They are based on the stereotypes 
people have about each group. People have an idea about what the prototypical poor 
person looks like, or how the prototypical banker behaves, and they categorize 
themselves into group identities by comparing themselves to the group prototype. 
Individuals identify as a poor person or a banker if they think they resemble, or fit, that 
prototype (Hogg et al. 1995; Turner et al. 1987). And they also feel closest to a group 
when they think other groups’ prototypes look very different from them, a concept social 
psychologists call comparative fit (Hogg et al. 2004; Turner 1999). 
We can think of these prototypes as representing points on a continuum. For some, class 
may be the important dimension of political identity. Some parties will be seen as pro-
poor, whereas others are seen as favoring the interests of the affluent. In many instances, 
that class dimension correlates highly with the standard left-right ideological dimension 
that orients politics in much of the world (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lijphart 1994). 
Parties that pursue redistribution to the poor will be seen as representing the poor; those 
that limit regulation on businesses will be seen as favoring the interests of the affluent. In 
the Latin American context, the most salient political dimension appears to be the 
economic left-right (e.g., Altman et al. 2009; Colomer and Escatel 2005; Wiesehomeier 
and Doyle 2012). 
As with other social identities, a voter feels closest to the party whose prototype she 
thinks she most resembles, relative to all other parties (Green et al. 2005). Over the 
course of their lives, voters form perceptions of party prototypes based on what they see 
the parties say and do over time.8 They learn what to associate with the prototypical 
                                                        
8 Recent studies have found clear evidence that voter perceptions indeed respond to party behavior (e.g., 





















partisan by observing what politicians say and do, and they use these prototypes to 
inform their identity. These prototypes comprise what I call a party brand. Voters 
repeatedly update their perceptions of parties’ brands, incorporating new observations 
into their prior beliefs about the parties (Achen 1992).9 
Party brands can also be weak or strong, depending on how precisely voters can pinpoint 
them. When voters see a party sending clear signals, they develop a clearer image of its 
prototypical partisan, and the brand becomes stronger. As their uncertainty about the 
party’s position increases, the party appears to be more heterogeneous, perhaps 
containing multiple prototypes, and the brand becomes diluted. 
These learned party brands form the basis of voters’ attachments. A voter will feel the 
greatest affinity with the party whose prototypical partisan she thinks she most 
resembles, relative to all other parties. As with other social identities, partisan identity is 
determined partly by the resemblance, or fit, between the voter’s self-image and her 
image of the party prototype. Party attachments, therefore, increase as voters perceive 
they more closely fit with the party. Moreover, the more ambiguous the party brand, the 
weaker that attachment because a voter will perceive less fit with the party prototype. 
Crucially, the degree of identification also depends on comparative fit, the degree to 
which a voter feels she resembles the prototype of one group and differs from that of 
another group. Thus, a voter will feel most attached to a party when its prototype most 
resembles her and the prototypes of other parties seem very different. 
This conception of partisanship implies that the behaviors of parties can affect voter 
attachments (Lupu 2013b). In particular, parties can dilute their brands through 
inconsistency or convergence. Inconsistency increases voter uncertainty about the party 
brand when parties suffer from internal conflicts (see also Grynaviski 2010). Voters 
                                                        
9 This way of thinking about party brands departs from prior theories in two important ways. For Green et 
al. (2005), a party prototype is the typical person who votes for that party. So blue-collar workers who 
think that most blue-collar workers vote for Democrats will perceive the Democratic prototype as a blue-
collar worker. I suggest that we think of party prototypes not as the typical party supporter, but as the 
typical party beneficiary. So the prototypical Democrat might be seen as a blue-collar worker if the 
Democratic Party is perceived to be the party that looks out for blue-collar workers. I also argue that these 
prototypes derive in voters’ minds from a broader set of observations besides voting patterns.  Voters rely 
on other heuristics, including the actions of party elites, to determine what kind of voter a party serves. The 
party whose elites regularly meet with African American interest groups, march in civil-rights protests, and 
support policies considered to benefit the African American community, is also more likely to be seen as 





















receive conflicting signals from the party and find themselves more uncertain about the 
party brand. Inconsistency also confuses voters when a party shifts its position. Voters 
may, to take a Latin American example, observe a party they thought was statist suddenly 
support free-market economic policies (Stokes 2001).10 
Party brands will also dilute when parties converge. As they do, voters become unable to 
distinguish one party brand from another.11 They may observe that different party brands 
are indistinguishable because elites from different parties support the same policies. Or 
they may see different parties entering into formal or informal alliances, signals that they 
are willing to agree on a political agenda (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013). Even when 
voters are certain about two party brands, their substitutability means that voters fail to 
form strong attachments with either party. 
Partisanship thus erodes in response to party inconsistency and convergence. But the 
erosion of partisanship also has electoral implications. Voters evaluate parties both in 
terms their partisan attachments and in terms of performance. As voters become more 
attached to a party, they will forgive bad performance. But as they become less attached, 
performance will become an increasingly important determinant of vote choice (Kayser 
and Wlezien 2011). Party breakdown, therefore, occurs when two conditions are met: (1) 
the party’s brand is diluted, leading partisan attachments to erode, and (2) the party 
performs poorly in office. 
Partisan attachments eroded in Latin America because of growing confusion among 
voters about party brands, or what a party stands for. Few established parties in Latin 
America had the strong, consistent brands of many Western European parties. But 
voters had fairly clear notions about what it meant to be a Peronist in Argentina or an 
aprista in Peru. During the 1980s and 1990s, leaders across the region implemented 
policies that were inconsistent with their traditional party brand, provoked intraparty 
                                                        
10 Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) suggest that parties lose votes when they are inconsistent. That contrasts 
with evidence that voters favor ambiguous candidates (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009) and that economic 
policy shifts sometimes get rewarded electorally (Stokes 2001; Tavits 2007). Still, my focus here is on 
partisanship, not vote choice. I argue that policy shifts blur party brands and weaken partisanship, even if 
they sometimes also increase electoral support. 
11 Morgan (2011) similarly highlights the effect of interparty agreements, along with bad performance, on 
party-system collapse. Her argument focuses on formal alliances and vote choice, whereas I highlight the 
effect of interparty convergence of varying kinds on mass partisanship. By distinguishing partisanship from 
vote choice, my branding model explains instances of party convergence eroding voter partisanship that do 





















conflicts, and formed strange-bedfellow alliances with historic rivals. These actions 
diluted the brands of their parties, eroding voters’ attachments to them. Without the 
assured support of partisans, parties became more susceptible to negative valence 
evaluations and, when they performed poorly in office, broke down.12 
As Figure 1 illustrates, during the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American leaders engaged in 
behaviors that diluted the brands of their parties. They embarked on reforms that went 
against the basic tenets of their party’s brand and formed alliances with traditional rivals. 
That inconsistency and convergence with competitors eroded partisan attachments and 
made parties susceptible to voters’ short-term valence evaluations. Voters who now had 
no party attachments deserted incumbent parties when they performed poorly, causing 
established parties to collapse. 
Figure I. Theory of party breakdown 
 
 
                                                        
12 Inconsistency and convergence by parties are taken as exogenous here. This seems reasonable – parties 
are not unitary actors and intraparty conflicts erupt despite the efforts of party leaders to contain them. 
Moreover, in presidential systems like those of Latin America parties are often unable to control the 
actions of a president, even though her actions reflect on the party brand. Structural conditions and 
electoral incentives may induce presidents to take actions that dilute their party brand, like policy switches 
(Burgess and Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2001). One could ask under what conditions political elites would 





















IV. Evidence from Case Studies 
My theory has observable implications at both the individual and aggregate levels. At the 
individual level, we would expect to see party inconsistency and convergence weaken a 
voter’s partisan attachment. At the aggregate level, we should see the combination of 
brand dilution and bad performance lead to party breakdown. I test the individual-level 
theory elsewhere (Lupu 2013b, 2013c) and focus here on the aggregate-level implications. 
Across Latin America’s 18 major democracies, 105 presidential elections took place 
between 1978 and 2007.13 How many of these elections witnessed the breakdown of an 
established political party? To answer this question, we need to first identify the 
established parties that competed in these elections. 
Established parties are those that are competitive for executive office. That means that 
they have been competitive in national contests over several election cycles, making them 
likely future competitors. Specifically, I consider established those parties that in two 
consecutive elections either receive a plurality of the vote, winning the first round, or 
attracts no less than one-third of the winning vote-share. One-third is, of course, an 
arbitrary cutoff, but this coding scheme identifies the set of parties typically highlighted 
by country experts (e.g., Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg 2001). By my classification, 44 
established parties competed for the presidency in Latin America between 1978 and 
2007. 
How many of these established parties broke down? I define party breakdown as a 
massive electoral defeat for an established political party in a single election cycle. This 
occurs when, from one election to the next, an established party ceases to meet the 
criteria for being considered established. By this definition, 11 of Latin America’s 
established parties broke down in the three decades I analyze.14 That means that one-
quarter of the established parties in the region broke down.  And these cases span eight 
                                                        
13 I include only elections that occur under minimally democratic regimes, identified as country-years with a 
positive Polity score. The electoral data are drawn from Payne et al. (2007) and updated by the author; 
where relevant, they apply only to the first round of balloting. 
14 The cases are UCR in Argentina (2003), ADN in Bolivia (2002), MIR in Bolivia (2005), MNR in Bolivia 
(2005), PUSC in Costa Rica (2006), PRSC in the Dominican Republic (1996), PAN in Guatemala (2003), APRA 





















of Latin America’s 18 major democracies. Party breakdown is, thus, not an isolated 
phenomenon, but a regional trend. 
These breakdowns entailed an average drop of nearly 80 percent in the share of the 
party’s vote from one election to the next. Parties that had only recently been major 
competitors were relegated to an average vote share of merely 6 percent. But these were 
not flash parties: at the time they broke down, they were nearly 70 years old, on average.15 
IV. 1. Case selection 
To identify the effect of brand dilution and performance on party breakdown, I turn to 
case studies and detailed comparisons of matched cases. Cases ought to represent the 
range of variation on my explanatory variables, whether or not brand dilution occurred in 
the prior electoral cycle, and whether or not the incumbent party’s economic 
performance was bad (Slater and Ziblatt Forthcoming). 
As both brand dilution and economic performance are continuous, I split my sample into 
two groups for each variable. I distinguish those observations with high or low levels of 
brand dilution based on secondary sources (see Lupu 2013c). To identify cases of bad 
performance, I construct an economic “misery index” to capture objective economic 
conditions typically thought to affect retrospective voting, GDP growth, inflation, and 
unemployment (cf. Welsch 2007).16 Since I am interested in whether economic 
performance was particularly bad in each case, I separate those in the top quartile of 
economic misery from all the other cases. This allows me to arrange the cases into a 
simpler array with only four cells. 
Table 1 illustrates this array and shows the selected cases. The top left corner represents 
status quo cases, where established parties maintain their brand and avoid bad economic 
performance. Even if their performance is not particularly good, they at least do no 
harm. Compare that to the bottom right corner, where parties both dilute their brands 
                                                        
15 At the time of these breakdowns, the surviving established parties were 50 years old, on average. 
16 I construct the index using principal-components factor analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation 
(eigenvalue = 1.41).  The factor loadings are: GDP growth = -0.85, inflation = 0.81, unemployment = 0.21. 
The index captures economic conditions in the year prior to each election because those seem to be most 






















and perform badly. This shaded cell represents the cases in which I expect party 
breakdown. But comparing the diagonal cells does not allow us to isolate the effects of 
brand dilution and bad performance to see whether just one of them is sufficient to 
cause party breakdown. For that, we need to look at cases in the off-diagonal cells, where 
only one of these variables changes. We should still see some different outcomes in these 
cases. In the top right corner, cases with only brand dilution, we should see partisan 
attachments erode even though the incumbent party does not break down. In cases that 
fall in the bottom left corner, we should see partisanship remain stable even though bad 
performance means the incumbent party likely loses the election. 
Table I. Cases and key explanatory variables 
  Brand dilution 

























Note: Party-election cases arrayed according to degree of brand dilution and bad 
economic performance. High/low levels of brand dilution are assessments 
based on secondary sources.  Bad performance refers to cases that fall above 
the 75th percentile on the economic misery index. Cases in the shaded cell 
represent those expected to result in party breakdown. 
 
 
I selected these cases to overlap within- and cross-country matched comparisons. This 
combination identifies sufficient causes and rules out confounding factors and alternative 
explanations (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007). Matching cases within the same 
party or country allows me to ensure that other factors common across cases –say, 
characteristics of the party or of the country– cannot explain different outcomes. 
Comparing across the two countries is also useful because Argentina and Venezuela 
differ significantly in terms of both institutions and social characteristics, including 
federalism, electoral rules, resource dependence, poverty, and ethnic fragmentation. 
Therefore, these differences cannot explain similar outcomes across the two countries. 





















and bad performance are individually sufficient causes of party breakdown, or whether 
they are only jointly sufficiently. 
I selected AD 1988, AD 1993, and AD/COPEI 1998 because they represent the only within-
party observations for which both brand dilution and bad performance vary over this 
period.17 Comparing AD in 1988 and 1993 tests whether brand dilution on its own is a 
sufficient condition for breakdown in a particularly controlled setting, the same party 
over time. I selected the UCR in Argentina because it is the only party in the region that 
faced two economic crises while in power on two separate occasions during the sample 
period. Comparing the UCR in 1989 and 2003 offers a within-party test of whether bad 
performance on its own is a sufficient condition for breakdown. A useful within-country 
comparison to the UCR in 2003 is the PJ in 1995. Together, the three Argentine cases 
allow comparison both across parties within a system and within a party over time. 
Across the two countries, the comparison of the UCR in 2003 and AD/COPEI in 1998 
rules out confounders that differ between these parties and settings. 
In order to account for potential biases in source material for these case studies and 
establish the sequence of events, I triangulate claims as much as possible across diverse 
types of evidence. I rely on historical polling data; legislative data; and primary and 
secondary sources, including scholarly work, newspaper reports, memoirs of political 
actors, and recorded interviews conducted by previous scholars. I also conducted open-
ended interviews during 2008–12 with political elites and observers from each period.18 
Within each case, I trace the processes of brand maintenance or brand dilution and 
probe their effects on aggregate partisan attachment using context-specific information 
(Collier et al. 2004). As much as possible, I use survey data and newspaper coverage to 
gauge public opinion over the course of each administration. The survey data come from 
a variety of polling firms, vary in geographic coverage, and vary question wording over 
                                                        
17 As I discuss below, AD and COPEI entered a quasi-coalition government in the late 1990s and are, 
therefore, treated here as a single case. 
18 Due to space constraints, I do not present corroborating evidence for every claim here (but see Lupu 





















time. Still, they are the best estimates of public opinion at the time. In each case, I 
present the most reliable and appropriate data available.19 
IV. 1. 1. UCR 1989 
When democracy returned to Argentina in 1983, so too did the two political parties that 
had contested elections in prior periods of democracy, the UCR and PJ. Since its 
emergence in the1940s, the PJ drew its electoral support from the rural poor and urban 
working classes while the UCR was the the party of middle and upper classes (Lupu and 
Stokes 2009). In a September 1986 survey, nearly 50% of survey respondents named the 
UCR as “the party most bound to privileged sectors”; only 8% named the PJ.  In contrast, 
54% thought the PJ offered “the most concrete solutions for neediest sectors,” and 73% 
thought it “best represented workers,” compared to 25% and 14%, respectively, for the 
UCR.20 
Both parties relied on patronage to maintain internal discipline and to mobilize sectors of 
the electorate (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Snow 1971). But the two parties also worked 
assiduously to build and maintain partisan attachments (Lupu and Stokes 2010). Already 
in 1965, 46% of Argentines identified with a party, of which 35% identified with the UCR 
and 30% with the PJ (Kirkpatrick 1971: 87). By October 1984, 58% of Argentines 
identified with a party, 52% of them with the Peronists and 33% with the Radicals 
(Catterberg 1989: 63). 
Radical president Raúl Alfonsín came into office in 1983 facing military challenges and a 
deteriorating economy. Still, Alfonsín managed to maintain discipline within the UCR. 
Among the most controversial of the administration’s initiatives were two bills dealing 
with the crimes of the military regime. Despite contravening the convictions of many 
Radicals, the bills achieved near-unanimous UCR support in both chambers of Congress 
(Mustapic and Goretti 1992). 
                                                        
19 For instance, I use survey data to supplement the objective measures of economic conditions with 
subjective measures that convey voters’ evaluations. Where available, I report survey respondents’ 
evaluations of national economic conditions, which most influence voting decisions (e.g., Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981). In other cases, I have to rely on questions regarding citizens’ personal economic situations 
as a second-best measure. 
20 Author’s calculations from Aresco survey of 1,000 adults in Greater Buenos Aires. The series of 
questions began, “Could you signal which of the political parties active in the province is...” The options 





















The UCR also accepted the administration’s economic policies, which became slightly 
more market-oriented over time. The administration sought to negotiate support from 
the IMF and at the same time pump government spending into the economy. A 
heterodox economic plan was unveiled in June 1985 to dampen escalating inflation and 
gained broad support from the UCR. Despite short-term success, growing labor disputes 
and creeping inflation quickly made that plan unsustainable. An increasingly desperate 
Alfonsín administration then took a slightly more market-oriented tack, but also won 
support from the UCR bloc in Congress (de Riz 1994). 
While the UCR achieved party unity even in the face of controversial policies, the PJ 
demonstrated disciplined opposition to the administration’s agenda. Along with its labor 
backers, the PJ staunchly opposed –and often blocked– Alfonsín’s economic proposals. It 
rejected both Alfonsín’s initial heterodox economic plan and his later, more market-
oriented proposal. PJ-backed unions led a remarkable 13 general strikes during Alfonsín’s 
administration, all with the public support and participation of PJ leaders. Anything short 
of opposition to Radical proposals was seen by Peronists as “illicit unions” (Mustapic 
and Goretti 1992: 268).21 
Faced with economic crisis and legislative gridlock, Alfonsín made overtures to the 
Peronist opposition and its labor allies. During the political crisis of the 1987 Holy Week 
military uprising, he approached PJ leader Antonio Cafiero about forming a unity 
government in support of democracy.22 While Cafiero and other party leaders appeared 
publicly with Alfonsín to defend democracy, Cafiero rejected a formal pact with the 
administration, calling it “electoral suicide.”23 Even in the face of democratic crisis, the 
two parties kept their distance. 
As the 1989 election approached, the choice between the UCR and PJ was stark. The 
UCR’s Eduardo Angeloz called for more dramatic market-oriented reforms while the 
Peronist Carlos Menem promised massive wage increases and price controls. The 
worsening economic situation on his party’s watch made this an uphill battle for 
                                                        
21 The PJ did suffer an important internal conflict in the 1980s. But unlike the intraparty conflicts that 
would emerge in the early 1990s, the conflict with the Renovation faction centered on organizational, 
rather than ideological, issues (Levitsky 2003). 
22 Clarín, September 7, 1989. 





















Angeloz. Although hyperinflation would not peak until after the May election, it was 
clear well before then that inflation was out of the administration’s control. As Rodolfo 
Díaz, who worked on Menem’s campaign, told me, “the campaign was overshadowed by 
the inflation issue; you could not talk about anything else”.24 On my index of economic 
misery, this elections falls at the 80th percentile. That means that objective economic 
conditions in this case were among the worst among preelection years across Latin 
America. 
Argentines also clearly viewed the administration’s performance negatively. By February 
1989, 50% of Argentines told interviewers that their personal economic situation had 
worsened in the prior five years.25 In March, two-thirds said their economic situation had 
worsened since the prior month.26 By April, the administration’s approval rating had 
fallen to 9% (Catterberg and Braun 1989: 363). 
Still, both parties had, broadly speaking, remained true to their party brands throughout 
the Alfonsín administration, and the distance between them was as wide as ever. 
Alfonsín’s gradual move toward a more neoliberal economic position represented some 
inconsistency, but only marginally so; elements of his party had always espoused more 
market-oriented preferences. And the Radicals under Alfonsín suffered little internal 
conflict and no signs of converging with the PJ. From the perspective of my theory of 
party breakdown, there is little reason to expect that partisan attachments eroded during 
the 1980s, even while opinions about the administration’s performance plummeted.  
Indeed, a consistent 20% of Argentines identified with the UCR throughout the 1980s, 
including the months just prior to the May election.27 
Angeloz managed to garner 37% of the vote in May 1989. That remarkable feat for the 
candidate of a party that had unequivocally failed in its economic stewardship attests to 
the strength of Radical partisanship. Thus, the case of the Radicals in 1989 is consistent 
with theoretical expectations. We do not see party breakdown result in 1989 from bad 
                                                        
24 Personal interview, November 18, 2009. 
25 Author’s calculations from Equas survey of 1,325 adult residents of Buenos Aires province. The 
question asked, “I’d like to know whether your personal and family situation has improved, remained more 
or less the same, or worsened in the last five years.” 
26 Author’s calculations from Kolsky survey of 405 adult residents of metropolitan Buenos Aires. The 
question asked, “Has your economic situation changed in the last month? Is it better, worse, or the same?” 





















incumbent performance in the absence of brand dilution. This challenges the 
conventional wisdom that posits bad incumbent performance as a sufficient condition 
for breakdown. 
IV. 1. 2. PJ 1995  
Menem was elected on a statist economic platform, promising to reverse the decline of 
the Argentine economy. But, upon taking office, he shocked Argentine voters and his 
own party by pursuing both a staunchly neoliberal set of economic policies and a series 
of alliances with anti-Peronist elites and former opponents (Stokes 2001). His first 
package of economic policies included a sharp devaluation of the currency and deep cuts 
in government spending. Menem also announced a legislative alliance with the rightwing 
Union of the Democratic Center. That Menem had abandoned the traditional ideology of 
Peronism was clear to the Argentine public. In an October 1990 survey, 60 percent of 
respondents agreed with the statement, “Menem is betraying the historical banners of 
Peronism.”28 
Both the PJ and UCR supported Menem’s initial plans, granting him emergency powers. 
But legislators from both parties made clear the temporary nature of their support. PJ 
deputy and Chamber president Alberto Pierri assured one newspaper, “The PJ is far from 
abandoning its historic model of effective protection of national production and the 
regional economies... the emergency project is a temporary concession that is made to 
the stabilization program.”29 But as Menem’s initial popularity declined, the PJ quickly 
turned to opposing the reforms. When hyperinflation returned in late 1989, the PJ 
majority in Congress refused to ratify the administration’s new economic plan. The party 
also rejected Menem’s proposal to institute a value-added tax in December 1989, forcing 
the economy minister to resign. The PJ-led Congress repeatedly subjected Roberto 
Dromi, Menem’s minister of public works, to harsh questioning and came close to 
censuring him.30 
                                                        
28 This includes respondents who said they “agree” or “strongly agree” with the statement. Author’s 
calculation from Equas survey of 400 adult residents of Greater Buenos Aires. 
29 Clarín, July 25, 1989. 
30 The conflicts within the PJ also forced Menem to veto legislation proposed by his own party. Alfonsín 





















The intraparty conflict went beyond the halls of Congress. A December 1989 party 
congress in Buenos Aires had to be suspended after Menem supporters and critics began 
throwing chairs at one another. In early 1990, Cafiero himself intensified criticism of the 
administration, calling on Menem to “return to the doctrinal sources of Justicialism.”31 
Menem acknowledged the possibility of a division of the PJ, noting “I don’t want a split...  
but if it happens, too bad”.32 Indeed, two prominent defections from the Peronist ranks 
did occur. Twenty prominent legislators defected from the PJ in early 1990 in protest 
over both the neoliberal economic agenda and Menem’s military amnesty laws. Mendoza 
Senator José Octavio Bordón also left the PJ in September 1994 to run for president 
under the newly formed Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO). 
The UCR also found itself unprepared for the Peronist president’s policy switch. With 
Menem offering policies nearly identical to those proposed by Angeloz during the 
campaign, the UCR found itself in the strange position of agreeing with the Peronist 
president. Menem immediately opened talks with UCR leaders about forming a unity 
government. Although a formal pact never materialized, the repeated attempts and 
negotiations received widespread media coverage and were far more serious than 
Alfonsín’s half-hearted attempts. Particularly noteworthy were two nearly-successful 
rounds of negotiation with Angeloz himself aimed at persuading the former presidential 
candidate to join Menem’s cabinet. As late as November 1991, Menem made serious 
public overtures for a pact among political parties. 
UCR leaders attempted to maintain the nuanced position of opposing some 
administration proposals while supporting the broad thrust of Menem’s economic 
program. Alfonsín himself oscillated between criticizing the speed of the economic 
reforms and offering his party’s support. In Congress, the UCR proved far less 
obstructionist than the PJ had been during the 1980s. While only 28 percent of roll-call 
votes in the Chamber of Deputies received bipartisan support in the 1987-89 session, 
that figure rose to nearly 48 percent in the 1989-91 session.33 
                                                                                                                                                               
percent of Menem’s 72 vetoes in his first term blocked legislation proposed by the opposition. Fully 65 
percent of his vetoes were directed at bills proposed by his own party (Mustapic 2000). 
31 La Nación, March 19, 1990. 
32 Clarín, April 1, 1990. 





















In the early months of 1992, Menem made clear his intention to seek reelection in 1995. 
Although the constitution did not allow for consecutive reelection, Menem began 
exploring ways to amend that provision. In late 1993 Alfonsín and Menem emerged from 
the presidential residence in Olivos to announce their agreement to a pact for the general 
framework of a constitutional reform. The Pact of Olivos represented renewed 
convergence by the two parties, with the UCR effectively conceding Menem’s reelection. 
Coverage of the pact promoted the perception that the two parties had become 
indistinguishable: cartoons, for instance, fused Menem and Alfonsín into a single figure.34 
One public opinion survey asked respondents who they thought was the clearest 
opposition to the administration. Despite decades of rivalry between Peronists and 
Radicals, by the end of 1993, only 14% of respondents cited the UCR.35 
Menem focused his 1995 campaign on his success in stabilizing inflation and restarting 
Argentina’s economy. Yet his policies had been the very opposite of traditional 
Peronism. As one Peronist voter put it, “Peronism is declining because the current 
government says it’s Peronist but is lying. So young people now say, ‘This is Peronism? 
No. I don’t like it’” (Martuccelli and Svampa 1997: 352). My theory suggests that that 
inconsistency, the resulting intraparty conflicts, and the convergence with the UCR should 
have eroded voters’ partisan attachments with both parties. Indeed, partisanship declined 
dramatically for both parties during this period. In October 1995, only 15 percent of 
Argentines identified with the PJ and less than 10 percent with the UCR.36 
Thus, both parties entered the 1995 election with a diminished constituency of partisans. 
But Menem was widely credited with economic success. Using my index of economic 
misery, objective conditions leading up to 1995 in Argentina fall at the 56th percentile, 
essentially at the regional average. The economic improvements also registered with 
voters. A survey taken two weeks before the election found that a majority of Argentines 
considered the country’s economic situation average or better. Only 35% of respondents 
                                                        
34 Clarín, December 13, 1993.  
35 Author’s calculations from survey of 492 adult residents of Greater Buenos Aires conducted by Romer 
& Associated. The questions asked, “What politician or political party do you think today represents the 
clearest opposition to the government?” I include in my measure both respondents who cited the UCR as a 
party and those who named Radical politicians. 
36 Author’s calculation from a national survey of 1,811 adults conducted by Romer & Associates. The 
question asked, “With which party do you identify more?  Which party best represents your way of 





















had a negative view of Menem’s performance in office.37 In the end, Menem won 
reelection with nearly 50 percent of the vote. Good incumbent performance allowed 
Menem and the PJ to win reelection and to avoid the detrimental electoral effects of the 
party brand’s dilution. On its own, brand dilution appears not to be a sufficient condition 
for breakdown. 
IV. 1. 3. UCR 2003 
The UCR regained the presidency in 1999 through an electoral coalition with FREPASO. 
The ticket of the Alliance for Work, Justice, and Education (Alianza) successfully elected 
the UCR’s Fernando de la Rúa president with FREPASO leader Carlos Álvarez as vice 
president.38 
But the governing party was riddled with internal conflict, particularly over economic 
policy. On taking office, Economy Minister José Luis Machinea announced tax increases 
and austerity measures, including cuts in education and social services, the very areas the 
Alianza had promised to reinforce. The cuts were deeply criticized by FREPASO legislators 
and cabinet members. Although the Alianza held a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, 
the dissent of some FREPASO legislators made it difficult for the administration to pass 
legislation. Like Menem before him, De la Rúa resorted to governing by decree: in fact, 
he issued more decrees in his first five months in office (19) than Menem had in his first 
five months (18).39 De la Rúa also ceased consulting with Álvarez and FREPASO, 
escalating the conflict.  Hostilities between the coalition partners came to a head in June 
2000, when reports that the administration had bribed senators led Álvarez to resign 
suddenly. 
Conflicts also emerged within the UCR. By early 2001, Argentina could no longer meet its 
IMF obligations. When De la Rúa and Machinea disagreed about how to proceed, the 
                                                        
37 Author’s calculations from Romer & Associates survey of a national sample of 1,325 adults. The 
economic question asked, “How would you characterize the general economic situation of the country?” 
Respondents were given the options “very bad,” “bad,” “average,” “good,” and “very good.”  The Menem 
question asked, “What opinion do you have of the way Carlos Menem is handling his tenure as president?” 
38 The De la Rúa administration is a somewhat unusual case since there is technically no single party brand 
that is affected by the actions of the administration and its allies. Still, numerous officials from the 
administration told me that it was viewed as a Radical one. In her memoir, Fernández Meijide also notes 
that many of the 1999 campaign’s rallies used UCR symbols instead of Alianza ones (Fernández Meijide 
2007: 145-6). 





















minister resigned. Without consulting party leaders, De la Rúa appointed Ricardo López 
Murphy to replace Machinea. A longtime Radical and staunch neoliberal, López Murphy 
immediately announced a new and deeper set of austerity measures, including deep cuts 
in education. His plan provoked criticism from both FREPASO and De la Rúa’s own UCR; 
three Radical cabinet members resigned in protest. Alfonsín soon added his own 
criticism of López Murphy’s appointment. 
Forced to reshuffle his cabinet yet again, De la Rúa replaced López Murphy with 
Domingo Cavallo, the economy minister responsible for Menem’s major economic 
policies. The president had decided he could not govern with FREPASO and hoped to rely 
instead on Cavallo’s backers in the PJ, provoking vehement reactions from FREPASO and 
UCR leaders.40 Cavallo sought emergency powers from Congress, just as he had in the 
1990s, but got them only with PJ support. Many of the administration’s own copartisans 
and coalition partners opposed the measure. One prominent UCR deputy, Elisa Carrió, 
denounced fellow Radicals who voted for the bill as “traitors,” and more than half of the 
FREPASO delegation voted against the measure.41 Days later, Carrió announced she was 
leaving the UCR to form a new party. 
The Radical party brand had become so meaningless, and so indistinguishable from the 
PJ, that politicians now preferred to form their own parties. As Fernando Melillo, at the 
time a FREPASO deputy, told me, “What did it mean to be Radical? Radical like De la 
Rúa? Like Alfonsín? Like López Murphy, who was saying the exact opposite of 
Alfonsín?”42 In the ensuing months, other FREPASO and UCR politicians, including 
Melillo, followed Carrió. The infighting among UCR party leaders led one newspaper to 
run the headline “Everyone against everyone”.43 
With the credibility of the De la Rúa administration in decline, economic uncertainty 
soared. International creditors began to speculate that the pegged exchange rate was 
unsustainable and massive withdrawals in late November 2001 provoked a liquidity crisis. 
De la Rúa froze bank deposits and imposed exchange controls by decree. Now unable to 
access their bank accounts, Argentines took to the streets. After days of riots and looting, 
                                                        
40 Domingo Cavallo, personal interview, September 7, 2012. 
41 La Nación, March 26, 2001. 
42 Personal interview, November 18, 2009. 





















De la Rúa declared a state of siege on December 19. Two days later, he resigned and 
dramatically boarded a helicopter on the roof of the presidential residence. 
De la Rúa’s resignation forced the PJ-controlled Senate to choose his successor. After 
some false starts, the Senate appointed Eduardo Duhalde, the former vice president who 
had lost the 1999 election to De la Rúa. His selection received the support of the PJ, UCR, 
and FREPASO. Duhalde called for a government of national unity and negotiated with 
both PJ and UCR governors, promising not to run in the 2003 elections. Two Radicals and 
one FREPASO leader joined his cabinet. And both the UCR and FREPASO supported 
granting Duhalde emergency decree powers, something they had denied De la Rúa. 
During his 17 months in office, Duhalde repeatedly relied on UCR and FREPASO support 
in Congress. FREPASO even joined the administration’s legislative bloc. 
By the time of the 2003 election, Argentina’s political parties were in disarray. The PJ, 
certain of victory, decided to run multiple candidates in the general election. FREPASO, 
diminished by the defection of many of its leaders, chose neither to contest the 2003 
election nor to support any candidate in the presidential race. The UCR nominated one of 
its older leaders, Leopoldo Moreau. 
The UCR’S inconsistencies and internal conflicts during the De la Rúa administration had 
so diluted its brand that few voters still identified with the party.  In the months leading 
up to the election, less than 5 percent of Argentines said they identified with the UCR.44  
At the same time, perceptions of De la Rúa’s economic performance were dismal. By 
objective economic measures, this case falls at the 98th percentile of economic misery in 
the region; indeed, only two elections in the region score worse. By 2003, the party of the 
incumbent had become the PJ, although voters almost unanimously blamed the UCR for 
the crisis. In a November 2001 survey, 69 percent of respondents said their personal 
economic situation was fairly poor or very poor. Fewer than 3 percent said the De la Rúa 
administration was managing things well or very well.45 
                                                        
44 Author’s calculation from various surveys of adults in Greater Buenos Aires conducted by Carlos Fara & 
Associates. 
45 Author’s calculations from a national survey of 1,200 adults conducted by Mora y Araujo & Associates.  
The economic question asked, “How is your personal economic situation today?  Very good, fairly good, 
fairly poor, or very poor?” The De la Rúa question asked, “How do you believe the national government is 





















Blamed for disastrous performance in office and lacking a partisan base, the UCR was 
doomed. A party that only four years earlier had garnered 48 percent of the vote now 
attracted a mere 2%. The 2003 election thus dealt the death blow to the UCR, which has 
since been uncompetitive in national elections. The Argentine party system had gone 
from a stable two-party system to a fragmented system of competing personalities with 
no clear party brands. Even the PJ, which muddled through its own brand’s dilution 
during the economic crisis, would need to reconstruct its brand to recover the level of 
partisan attachments it had once enjoyed. 
The UCR had performed dismally before, in 1989. But back then, it still had a loyal base 
of partisans supporting its candidate.46 Bad performance alone was not enough to cause 
the party’s breakdown in 1989. Only in 2003, when bad performance was combined with 
brand dilution that eroded voter attachments, did breakdown occur. 
IV. 1. 4. AD 1988 
Prior to the 1990s, democratic politics in Venezuela was dominated by AD and COPEI.  
Although both became broad-based parties, the more populist AD drew greater support 
from the poor and from labor, while COPEI attracted more urban and middle-class voters 
(Ellner 1984; Morgan 2011). Respondents to an October 1983 survey placed AD on 
average at 3.59 and COPEI to its right at 4.08 on a 5-point left-right scale.47 Over three 
decades of competition, these parties fostered deep attachments. By November 1982, 
roughly half of Venezuelan voters identified with either AD or COPEI.48 
                                                                                                                                                               
chronologically closer survey would be preferable. But polls by then no longer asked respondents to 
evaluate the De la Rúa administration 
46 A potential confounding factor in this comparison is a history effect, that voters punished the party 
severely in 2003 because De la Rúa’s economic failure built upon Alfonsín’s bad performance in 1989. 
There are at least two reasons to doubt this as explanation. First, such a history effect would fail to account 
for the decline in partisanship for both the UCR and PJ in the 1990s and early 2000s. It would also fail to 
generalize to the breakdowns of AD and COPEI in Venezuela since those parties had not overseen prior 
episodes of economic crisis 
47 Author’s calculation from a national survey of 1,789 adults conducted by Enrique Baloyra and Aristides 
Torres of the Universidad Simón Bolívar in collaboration with Gallup International. The question asked, 
“In politics, people also say that so-and-so is on the right, in the center, or on the left... Where is 
AD/COPEI, in the center, on the left, or on the right?” The difference between these two means is 
statistically significant (p < 0.000). 
48 Author’s calculation from a national survey of 3,000 adults conducted by Datos. The question asked, 





















Like Alfonsín in Argentina, AD president Jaime Lusinchi inherited an economy in crisis 
when he took office in 1983. The debt crisis put pressure on Venezuelan foreign 
reserves, increasing inflation. Even more so than his Argentine counterpart, Lusinchi 
responded in a manner consistent with his party’s statist brand: he announced a largely 
heterodox economic plan of price controls, exchange controls with gradual devaluations, 
and government spending to stimulate the economy. The plan enjoyed the full support 
of AD, both in public and in Congress. 
The president’s relationship with his party was extremely close. In a speech at a party 
convention shortly after his inauguration, Lusinchi said, “I am –and am proud to be– an 
expression of the will of Democratic Action” (quoted in Rey 2009: 203). Lusinchi met 
with AD leaders every Tuesday to consult with them about the administration’s agenda.  
When, like his predecessors, he was tasked with appointing state governors, Lusinchi 
appointed AD’S party secretaries from each state to the posts. So close was the president’s 
relationship with his party that halfway through his term he could declare, “mine has 
been the most adeco of AD administrations.”49 
Two of Lusinchi’s signature initiatives could have generated friction with his party. 
Declining oil prices forced Lusinchi to take some austerity measures, cutting the budgets 
of state ministries and salaries of government workers and dismantling or privatizing 
small state-owned enterprises. The AD-controlled labor movement voiced some 
objections to these efforts, but its criticisms were mild. Labor leaders took great pains 
not to direct their complaints directly at the administration. Lusinchi had also expressed 
initial support for institutional reform and in 1984 appointed prominent figures to a 
Presidential Commission for State Reform (COPRE). The eventual recommendations of 
the COPRE included direct election of governors, decentralization, and changes to the 
electoral rules. But when AD rejected the proposals, fearing they would threaten the 
party’s hold on power, Lusinchi immediately backed down. 
COPEI opposed Lusinchi’s economic policies and the AD-backed Enabling Law that 
granted him special powers to legislate them. COPEI leader Eduardo Fernández declared 
that his party expected to “capitalize on the failures” of Lusinchi’s economic policies.50 
                                                        
49 El Nacional, July 28, 1986. 





















Since AD controlled a majority in Congress, COPEI’S opposition aimed mostly at stalling 
the president’s policies. COPEI repeatedly accused members of Lusinchi’s cabinet of 
corruption and brought motions of censure against two of them. Unlike AD, COPEI came 
out in favor of the political reforms proposed by the COPRE. 
By the time of the 1988 election, Lusinchi had succeeded in stimulating economic 
growth. Using my region-wide index of economic misery, Venezuela’s 1988 election falls 
at the 23rd percentile, well below the regional average of economic hardship. In other 
words, Lusinchi’s economic performance was quite good by objective standards. 
Venezuelan voters largely registered the same positive assessment. In an October 1988 
survey, 57 percent told interviewers that their economic situation was either the same as 
or had improved in the prior year. And 71 percent of Venezuelans had a neutral or 
positive evaluation of Lusinchi’s performance in office.51 In fact, when he left office, 
Lusinchi was widely considered to have been Venezuela’s most popular president. 
The distinctions between the election’s candidates reinforced the differences between AD 
and COPEI. AD’S candidate, former president Carlos Andrés Pérez, promised wage 
increases and continued state protections through exchange controls and tariffs. He 
frequently recalled the statist oil-boom years of his first administration. COPEI’S 
Fernández advocated reducing the role of the state in the economy, removing exchange 
controls, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. Fernández faced a formidable 
challenge, confronting not only Pérez’s charisma and public approval of his 
administration, but also widespread approval of Lusinchi’s performance in office. The 
results of the election bore out Pérez’s obvious: the former president secured reelection 
with 53% of the vote. 
The 1980s were thus a period of continuity with the brands of the established 
Venezuelan political parties. Lusinchi led an administration characterized by its close ties 
to AD and policies consistent with the party’s tradition of statism and labor protection. 
Meanwhile, COPEI opposed these policies from the right, arguing for greater market 
                                                        
51 Author’s calculations from a national survey of 2,000 adults conducted by Datos. The retrospective 
economic questions asked, “In general terms, compared to a year ago, would you say your economic 
situation is better than a year ago, the same as a year ago (good), the same as a year ago (fair), the same as a 
year ago (bad), or worse than a year ago?” The approval question asked, “How would you characterize how 
the current administration has performed for you personally?” The response options were “positive,” 






















orientation and economic liberalization. From the perspective of my theory, this 
consistency should have led to partisan stability. Indeed, over the course of the Lusinchi 
administration, levels of partisanship remained relatively constant: a year before the 
election, over 53 percent of voters still identified with either AD or COPEI.52 And given 
the positive evaluation of Lusinchi’s performance, 1988 became the first time in 
Venezuelan history that a president handed power to a successor from his own party. 
IV. 1. 5. AD 1993 
Within days of winning the election, Pérez overturned his campaign platform. Like 
Menem in Argentina, he reassured business leaders that he would not pursue his 
promised across-the-board wage increases and gathered neoliberal technocrats into his 
cabinet to implement a “shock-therapy” program of economic liberalization. Pérez also 
made overtures to anti-AD sectors, appointing independents and vocal AD opponents to 
his cabinet. Following the COPRE proposals abandoned by Lusinchi, he also introduced 
legislation for the direct election of governors and backed transferring fiscal 
responsibilities to states and municipalities. 
Like the PJ, AD leaders in Congress initially accepted Pérez’s initiatives. But their support 
dissipated after riots in Caracas dealt a blow to Pérez’s popularity. Previous AD presidents 
like Lusinchi had been granted special decree powers by Congress, but AD refused to 
ratify a similar Enabling Law for Pérez. Instead, the party launched a persistent campaign 
to force Pérez to change course, becoming what Corrales (2002: 97) calls a “virtual 
opposition force”. AD shelved or severely weakened many of the president’s initiatives in 
Congress. When the administration proposed a crucial value-added tax in May 1990, AD 
joined COPEI in voting against the bill. Even those reforms that passed Congress faced 
enormous scrutiny and opposition from AD leaders during debates. At the same time, 
AD-backed labor unions overturned their historical restraint during AD administrations 
and strike activity reached levels previously only seen under COPEI presidencies (Arrieta 
Álvarez and Iranzo Tacoronte 2009: 65). 
Pérez returned fire, blaming the economic situation on his predecessor and, by extension, 
his own party. In early 1990, his administration began investigating members of 
                                                        
52 Author’s calculation from a national survey of 2,000 adults conducted by Datos. The question asked, 





















Lusinchi’s cabinet –and eventually Lusinchi himself– for corruption. One result of the 
intraparty conflict was that Pérez’s administration reversed a pattern of Venezuelan 
legislation: while previous presidents had dominated new legislation, with over three-
quarters of the ordinary laws passed originating in the executive,53 only a third of ordinary 
legislation during Pérez’s second term was initiated by the executive. This parallels the 
legislative pattern during Menem’s first term, when the president was much more likely 
to veto legislation initiated by his own party. Pérez’s administration came to be 
dominated by intraparty conflict. 
The AD president’s switch toward market reforms also presented COPEI with a dilemma, 
much as Menem’s had done for the UCR. The opposition party rejected some proposals, 
along with the president’s critics in his own party. But at other times, COPEI supported 
the administration’s economic policies, many of them very similar to those Fernández 
himself had proposed during the campaign. As Fernández told me, “Nobody voted for 
me so that I could be in opposition... Our first loyalty is to the country. I told people that 
if the president from other side is proposing something that is good for the country, we 
have to support it”.54 COPEI also endorsed the administration’s political reforms, 
supporting the 1989 law on direct gubernatorial elections and joining the president’s 
1990 Pact for Reform. 
Truly close cooperation between AD and COPEI did not come until 1992. As Pérez’s 
popularity continued to decline amid concerns over inflation, a group of mid-level army 
officers led by Hugo Chávez attempted to stage a coup d’etat. Almost unanimously, 
Venezuelan politicians came to the defense of the administration to demonstrate their 
support for democracy. On the night of the coup, Fernández joined a defiant Pérez at a 
television station for a joint condemnation of the coup. Within weeks, Pérez restructured 
his cabinet to form a unity government, bringing in prominent elites from both AD and 
COPEI. In an emergency session of Congress, both parties also supported the president’s 
request to temporarily suspend constitutional guarantees. 
                                                        
53 Ordinary laws are those that initiate first-time legislation, as opposed to those that reconcile vague or 
contradictory statutes, those that concern the national budget, and those that approve prior executive 
actions, usually international treaties. 





















The attempted coup, however, highlighted the public’s dissatisfaction with the president. 
As news reports also began circulating about money having gone missing from the 
interior ministry, both parties began to call for Pérez’s resignation. On May 21, 1993, the 
Senate unanimously suspended Pérez from office, a status made permanent when 
Congress met in joint session three months later. The president’s own party had voted to 
remove him from office. Neither party formally joined the subsequent interim 
government. 
The one political figure who did not take a forceful stand against the coup was Rafael 
Caldera, a former president and the founder of COPEI. Caldera had become a vocal critic 
of both the Pérez administration and his own party’s leadership, and in 1993 announced 
he would run for president under a new coalition of COPEI dissidents and small parties. 
Over the course of the 1993 presidential campaign, the platforms of the candidates 
reinforced the brand inconsistencies of the Pérez years. The most vocal supporter of 
Pérez’s economic reform agenda was COPEI’S candidate, Oswaldo Álvarez Paz. AD’S 
candidate, Claudio Fermín, instead distanced himself from Pérez and called for 
traditional AD program of social compensation. 
These inconsistencies, internal conflicts, and interparty convergence eroded voters’ 
attachments to AD and COPEI between 1988 and 1993. Attachments to AD declined 
throughout the Pérez administration, with attachments to COPEI remaining relatively 
steady until the particularly close convergence that began following the February 4 coup. 
The month before the election, only 12 percent of voters identified with each of the two 
established parties.55 Both parties entered the 1993 campaign with diminished partisan 
bases, and faced a slightly more fragmented party system. 
Pérez’s unpopularity made it a particularly uphill battle for Fermín. But by the time of the 
election, economic conditions had improved somewhat. On the index of economic 
misery, Venezuela’s 1993 election falls at the 64th percentile, neither particularly good 
nor especially bad. In fact, this case falls quite close to that of Argentina’s 1995 election, 
generally thought to be a case of good performance. Many Venezuelans were indeed 
neutral about the incumbent administration’s performance. In a September 1993 survey, 
42 percent said their personal economic situation had improved or remained the same in 
                                                        
55 Author’s calculation from a national sample of 2,000 adults conducted by Datos. The question asked, 





















the prior year.56 AD had become far more susceptible to retrospective evaluations now 
that its weak brand attracted far fewer partisans. But by the end of 1993, there was no 
overwhelming consensus that its performance had been poor. 
That allowed the party to attract those voters who viewed the AD administration 
positively even as it lost the stable support of its partisan base. In the end, a plurality of 
30 percent of the votes went to the victorious Caldera. Like the PJ, AD saw its partisan 
ranks erode between 1988 and 1993, but its economic performance was not bad enough 
to cause the party’s breakdown. While Fermín lost the presidential election, the party 
remained competitive. 
IV. 1. 6. AD/COPEI 1998  
Caldera’s administration faced economic crisis immediately upon taking office. On 
January 7, 1994, one of the largest commercial banks in Venezuela declared bankruptcy, 
sparking a run on the currency and forcing devaluation. Caldera provided government 
assistance to the bank, but as more and more banks required assistance concern grew 
about the government’s solvency. By mid-1994, inflationary pressures forced Caldera to 
impose price and financial controls. 
Caldera also began his new term from a weak political position, having won only a third 
of the popular vote. His party held only 13% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies; in 
fact, no single party held anywhere near a congressional majority. At the outset, Caldera 
opted not to formalize an alliance with AD or COPEI, instead forming ad hoc alliances as 
needed. As Corrales (2000) summarizes, “the [Caldera] government spent most of its 
time forming and undoing alliances with opposition parties.” 
In time, AD and Caldera arrived at an unofficial –though widely recognized– alliance. It 
was AD that proposed delegating decree authority to Caldera following the banking crisis, 
something the party had refused to do with Pérez. And while both AD and COPEI initially 
                                                        
56 Author’s calculations from a national survey of 2,000 adults conducted by Datos. The economic 
question asked, “Comparing your current economic situation to a year ago, would you say your situation is 
better than a year ago, the same as a year ago, or worse than a year ago?” The approval questions asked, 
“How would you characterize the work the current administration is doing for you personally?” The 
response options were “positive,” “more positive than negative,” “neither positive nor negative,” “more 





















criticized Caldera’s suspension of economic guarantees, it was AD that backed down once 
a standoff ensued between Congress and the president. By 1995, AD openly supported a 
series of laws granting Caldera extraordinary powers and then voted against 
congressional efforts to censure two members of his administration. In return, Caldera 
supported judicial nominations made by AD and preserved the positions of AD-
appointees in the bureaucracy. As AD leader Octavio Lepage put it, “[AD secretary-
general Luis] Alfaro [Ucero] practically co-governed with Caldera.”57 
Although COPEI formally maintained a consistent oppositional stance, it was difficult to 
dissociate Caldera’s administration from the party he had founded. During the campaign, 
Caldera frequently reminded supporters that casting the COPEI ballot would not mean 
voting for him. Yet he confusingly referred to Álvarez Paz as “the official candidate of 
COPEI” and himself as “the true copeyano”.58 COPEI leaders took pains throughout the 
administration to remind voters that Caldera was no longer associated with their party. 
But as one prominent COPEI Deputy told me, “The people thought it was a COPEI 
administration and that its problems were internal problems with Caldera”.59 
The result, by the midpoint of the Caldera administration, was a dizzying array of 
interparty alliances. One AD Deputy characterized the period with a baseball analogy: 
“One day your jacket says Yankees, but then you see the other guy is winning and 
suddenly your jacket says Red Sox... That is the signal AD and COPEI sent”.60 
Venezuelan voters also registered the ever-closer relations between the parties. The 
survey firm Datos regularly asked respondents who disliked the government of the day 
who they thought would have done a better job. In the past, most cited the other major 
party. In November 1982, 85% of respondents who preferred an alternative to the COPEI 
administration of Luis Herrera Campíns thought AD would have done a better job. In 
March 1986, 60 percent of those unsatisfied with Lusinchi would have preferred a COPEI 
                                                        
57 Personal interview, January 28, 2010. 
58 El Nacional, November 4-20, 1993. News reports after the election suggested that many voters who cast 
their ballots for Álvarez Paz had intended to vote for Caldera (El Nacional, December 6-7, 1993). 
59 Nelson Chitty La Roche, personal interview, January 19, 2010. 





















government. But in March 1995, less than 10% of respondents unhappy with Caldera 
cited AD as a better alternative.61 
Caldera’s need for allies became even more acute as the economic situation deteriorated. 
By early 1996, annual inflation reached 60% and unemployment 15%. In April, Caldera 
announced an economic adjustment program that resembled the Pérez reforms he had 
so strongly criticized. AD, having ousted its own president for pursuing a similar set of 
policies, now backed Caldera’s efforts. Its members in Congress voted to allocate 
resources to bailout funds and voted for the privatization of the steel company Sidor. 
COPEI also supported the new economic program in Congress, and Caldera approached 
Fernández about joining his cabinet.62 In an attempt to form a unity government, the 
president even sought to incorporate the leaders of the 1992 coup attempt, Francisco 
Arias Cárdenas and Chávez. 
As the 1998 elections approached, it became clear that neither AD nor COPEI had 
competitive candidates. Chávez had entered the race under a new party and leaders from 
the established parties worried about negative coattails effects hurting their chances in 
concurrent presidential, legislative, and gubernatorial elections. In May 1998, AD and 
COPEI jointly approved a measure to move the presidential election to December, 
keeping the legislative and gubernatorial vote a month earlier. The parties also discussed 
shoring up support by having one party abandon its candidate to support the other’s. 
After suffering significant losses in the November legislative elections, both parties 
abandoned their own candidates and backed the conservative independent Henrique 
Salas Römer in a final gambit to avert a Chávez victory. 
AD and COPEI had consigned themselves to near-total convergence. In a November 1998 
survey, respondents on average placed AD at 6.47 and COPEI at 6.51 on a 10-point left-
right spectrum.63 Venezuelans saw these parties as indistinguishable. This convergence 
                                                        
61 Author’s calculations from a 1982 national survey of 3,000 adults, 1986 national survey of 2,000 adults, 
and 1995 national survey of 2,000 adults.  The question asked, “Do you think another government would 
have done better?  What government?” 
62 Eduardo Fernández, personal interview, January 25, 2010. 
63 Author’s calculation based on a national survey of 1,500 adults conducted by Datos. The question asked, 
“In politics, people talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’... Where is AD, in the center, on the left, or on the right? And 





















led to a dramatic erosion of partisan attachments to AD and COPEI. By the end of 1998, 
less than 12% of Venezuelan still identified with either party.64 
Going into the election, Venezuela’s economic situation was again precarious. On the 
region-wide index of economic misery, the 1998 election in Venezuela falls at the 86th 
percentile, among the worst cases in the region and comparable to Argentina’s 1989 
election. In a survey taken between the November legislative and December presidential 
elections, only 4% of Venezuelans thought the state of the country had improved in the 
prior year. Only 26% evaluated either the administration’s performance or its economic 
policies positively.65 
Despite the last-ditch gambits by AD and COPEI, Chávez won the December 1998 
election with 56 percent of the vote, easily defeating Salas Römer. The parties’ own 
candidates, Irene Sáez and Luis Alfaro Ucero attracted a stunning 3.2%. The brands of 
AD and COPEI had become all but meaningless. As a result, their partisan ranks had 
eroded so dramatically that the election had become primarily valence based, focused on 
rejecting established institutions that had performed so poorly. Unlike in 1993, the 
combination of diluted party brands and bad performance in 1998 led to party 
breakdown. 
Some structural conditions also changed in Venezuela over the course of the 1990s and 
have been cited as possible causes for party breakdown. These include institutional 
changes like the direct elections of governors, decentralization of power, and electoral 
reforms, all of which could have weakened established parties. Similarly, declining state 
revenue resulting from both the regional debt crisis and falling oil prices may have 
weakened patronage-based parties. 
                                                        
64 Author’s calculation based on a national survey of 1,500 adults conducted by Datos. The question asked, 
“These days, in Venezuelan politics, do you consider yourself independent, a party activist, a party 
identifier, or someone who is not interested in politics?” 
65 Author’s calculation based on a national survey of 1,500 adults conducted by Datos. The general 
evaluation question asked, “In general terms, would you say that the situation in the country is better, the 
same, or worse than a year ago?” The performance evaluation question was worded, “Please tell us your 
opinion of the Caldera administration – has it been very bad, bad, good, or very good?” The question 
evaluating the administration’s economic policies asked, “What do you think of the economic policies of 






















While these changes may have challenged AD and COPEI, comparing across countries 
rules them out as sufficient conditions for party breakdown. Unlike Venezuela, Argentina 
did not decentralize political power during the 1990s nor make its electoral institutions 
significantly more permissive.66 Nor was the UCR heavily reliant on patronage, though it 
too broke down. Comparing these cases suggests that none of these changes was 
determinative of party breakdowns across both countries. In contrast, my theory 
accounts both for the cases of breakdown and for the erosion of partisan attachments 
even when parties survived. 
V. Party Brands and Democracy in Latin America and Beyond 
Since the mid-1990s, a quarter of the established political parties in Latin America have 
broken down. From one election to the next, they became irrelevant. The conventional 
wisdom among observers of Latin American politics has attributed party breakdowns to 
bad incumbent performance. But this explanation overpredicts breakdown. Other 
explanations focus on institutional or social changes. Although these changes posed new 
challenges for established parties, they cannot explain why some parties within a system 
break down whereas others survive. 
This paper instead focused on the interaction between elite behavior and mass attitudes. 
In Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, political leaders reversed party traditions and 
blurred their differences with their competitors. These reversals diluted the party’s brand 
and eroded voters' attachment to the parties. When diluted party brands combined with 
economic crisis, incumbent established parties broke down. 
Tracing six party-election cases from Argentina and Venezuela demonstrates the 
processes of brand maintenance and brand dilution by established parties. The UCR and 
AD maintained their brands in the 1980s, an effort associated with stable levels of 
partisan attachments. Both established parties, along with the PJ and COPEI, diluted their 
brands during the 1990s and 2000s through inconsistency and convergence. That brand 
dilution was associated with the stark erosion of partisan attachments, as predicted by my 
                                                        
66 Argentina’s constitutional reform on 1994 introduced a presidential runoff and a third senator for each 





















theory. When this dilution of party brands interacted with bad incumbent performance, 
as in the cases of AD/COPEI in 1998 and the UCR in 2003, these parties broke down. 
The Argentine and Venezuelan parties were not alone in the region. Incumbent parties 
across Latin American diluted their brands through policy reversals and convergence 
during the 1980s and 1990s. When those instances also coincided with economic decline 
or social upheaval, as they did for Bolivia’s MNR and Costa Rica’s United Social Christian 
Party (PUSC), these parties collapsed. In other countries, such as Chile, inconsistency and 
convergence has eroded partisanship, but good performance allowed parties to survive. 
Beyond Latin America, too, party convergence may have eroded voter attachments to 
Social Democratic parties in Western Europe when they moderated their platforms in the 
1990s (Evans and Tilley 2012a, 2012b; Kitschelt 1994). 
This suggests that parties may face trade-offs between attracting voters and maintaining a 
partisan base (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986). Yet, our theories about party strategy 
focus primarily on getting votes. If parties care about their brand, they may prefer to be 
consistent in their positions and to differentiate themselves from their opponents. That 
preference may conflict with the electoral incentive to converge on the median voter 
(e.g., Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). Theories that incorporate parties’ interests 
in fostering and maintaining partisan attachments might generate new expectations 
regarding party strategy and competition. 
What these cases also demonstrate is that the market reforms of the 1990s in Latin 
America had lasting effects on public opinion, party competition, and democratic 
representation in the region. These reforms were often implemented via policy switches 
that in and of themselves vitiated mandates and made campaigns less credible, weakening 
democratic representation (Stokes 2001). But these switches also diluted party brands, 
precipitating the erosion of partisan attachments and, in some cases, the breakdown of 
established political parties. 
Those breakdowns had their own detrimental effects on democracy. Parties that break 
down are unlikely to return to electoral competitiveness. Generally, these breakdowns 
fragment the party system, with new parties emerging as instant electoral vehicles for 
prominent personalities. Voters have no priors about these new parties, and therefore 





















for voters to hold parties accountable and increases the electoral opportunities for 
unknown outsiders (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). An environment in which party 
brands are all but meaningless may also be self-reinforcing: if politicians are not at all 
bound by party labels, they may be freer to regularly change positions and allies. 
This study thus highlights that partisanship, political parties, and partisan conflict are 
fundamental features of democratic politics. Scholars and political commentators 
routinely deride the unseemliness of partisan politics, the clubbiness of organized parties, 
and the apparent thoughtlessness of mass partisanship. Yet it is because political parties 
play crucial roles in facilitating democratic representation and accountability that the 
erosion of partisanship and party breakdown pose not only a theoretical puzzle but also a 
threat to the quality of Latin American democracies. The fragmentation of party systems, 
the emergence of unknown and, at times, undemocratic politicians, and the ideological 
vacuousness that characterizes post-breakdown democracies in Latin America should 
serve as a warning. There is surely much for democrats to dislike about political parties 
that are too strong and polarized and partisanship that is too stable; but democrats ought 
also beware the perverse effects of weak parties, partisan convergence, and widespread 
partisan independence. 
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